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This work explores the impact of the model attorney ethics
rules on business incubation. Business incubation is a
business support process in which the business incubator
provides a variety of support services to client start-up
companies. One of the hallmarks of business incubation is
the interdependence of business incubators and client
companies regarding management and operations.
Attorneys can provide valuable services to client
companies in business incubator systems, but ethics rules
place restrictions on attorneys providing concurrent
representation to clients with differing interests and thus,
may negatively impact the potential benefits an attorney
can provide. In addition, attorneys can serve as valuable
sources of financing for the start-up companies through
equity compensation schemes. However, ethics rules limit
attorney business-dealings with clients to such a degree
that small businesses, with no other ability to compensate
attorneys, may be cut off from the benefit of attorney
advice. This work argues that exceptions to the rules are
needed to provide flexibility so that small businesses
engaged in business incubation are not cut off from
valuable attorney services.
Business incubators are entities set up to facilitate the start-up and
growth of entrepreneurial ventures and small businesses. According to the
National Business Incubation Association ("NBIA"), "[b]usiness incubation
is a business support process that accelerates the successful development of
start-up and fledgling companies by providing entrepreneurs with an array
of targeted resources and services."1 The types of support services offered
differ among incubators, but they commonly include rental space, shared
basic business services such as secretarial and telephone answering
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1 NBIA, What is Business Incubation?, http://www.nbia.org/resourcecenter/what-is
/index.php (last visited February 6, 2007).
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services, technology support, and financing assistance.2 One of the
hallmarks of a successful business incubation program is the
interconnection between business incubator, start-up client, and the
community in general.3 As such, business incubation is heavily dependent
upon interpersonal connections, networks, experience, and trust.
4
Although business incubation programs have shown great promise
for stimulating economic development, 5 the current ethics rules governing
attorneys may be hindering business incubators' capacity to assist newborn
businesses. Unless stringent consent requirements are met, the rules forbid
an attorney from representing two clients whose interests may be
incongruous, even though both may benefit from the concurrent
6
representation. Furthermore, the rules make it complicated for attorneys to
accept forms of compensation other than cash,' even though small
businesses often find attorney services too expensive to utilize at the earliest
stages.8 The complexity of compliance with the rules and the uniqueness of
the relationships in the incubator context may discourage attorneys from
working with incubators. 9 In addition, the rules may serve as a barrier to the
necessary interconnectedness between the incubator and the client
company.1° The discussion below explores these issues, offering guidance
to practitioners to avoid common pitfalls, and argues that an alternative to
the current rules is needed to accommodate the unique needs of business
incubators and other organizations that require mutual dependence and
interconnectedness to survive.
2 See id
3 See NBIA, Principles & Best Practices, http://www.nbia.org/resourcecenter/best_
practices/index.php (last visited February 6, 2007).
4 See NBIA, supra note 1 ("[S]ervices are usually developed or orchestrated by
incubator management and offered both in the business incubator and through its
network of contacts."). Cf NBIA, supra note 3 (Among the best practices for business
incubators listed are developing appropriate resource and experience networks,
recruiting incubator managers and directors capable of achieving development goals,
and making proactive guidance and advice to client companies a top priority.)
5 See NBIA, Business Incubation Facts, http://www.nbia.org/resource center/bus inc
_facts/index.php (last visited February 6, 2007).6 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2003), available at http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule 1 7.html (last visited February 6, 2007); see also MODEL
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1983), available at http://www.law.
cornell.edu/ethics/aba/mcpr/MCPR.HTM (last visited February 6, 2007).
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule 1 8.html (last visited February 6, 2007).
8 See Ellen Rosen, Step ] in Starting a Small Business: Hire a Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 2006, at C6.
9 See Gwyneth E. McAlpine, Comment, Getting a Piece of the Action: Should Laiwyers
be Allowed to Invest in Their Clients' Stock?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 549, 567 (1999).
10 Cf McAlpine, supra note 9, at 575 (arguing that a lawyer is inclined to work more
aggressively on behalf of a client where interconnectivity is pronounced, especially
where the attorney has an equity stake in the client).
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I. WHAT IS SO SPECIAL ABOUT BUSINESS INCUBATION?
Before exploring why the current ethics rules shortchange the
business incubation dynamic, it will be useful to detail why business
incubators require unique treatment. Business incubation is a relatively new
concept in business development. The first American business incubator
opened in 1959, but the concept did not become common until the late
1970s and early 1980s. 11 During those years, the economy had shifted away
from a traditional manufacturing-based economy to one focused on
services. 12 As a result, traditional heavy-manufacturing states were left with
empty industrial facilities, out-migration, and a largely under-educated and
unemployed populace.1 3 Policymakers saw business incubation as a
potential solution to these problems. 14 A variety of governmental entities
began to invest resources in the development of business incubators. 15
One of the most common classifications of business incubators is
the type of client company the incubator targets.16 The first incubators
focused on technology firms or on combinations of light industrial,
technology, and service companies-termed mixed-use incubators.1 7 While
such incubators still exist today, many incubators have become more
specialized. 18 Incubators may attempt to maximize efficiency by targeting
specific industries or even industry segments, such as food processing,
medical technologies, space and ceramics technologies, arts and crafts, and
software development.' 9 Business incubators are often classified according
to the type of sponsoring organization 2 or type of community served.
I NBIA, The History of Business Incubation, http://www.nbia.org/resource-center/
what is/beginnings of inc/index.php (last visited February 6, 2007).
12 See Clovia Hamilton, High- Tech Transportation Corridors are in Vogue: Proposed





16 See NBIA, supra note 1. According to NBIA, the business incubator target market
breakdown is 47% mixed-use, 3 7% technology-based, 7 % manufacturing, 6 % service-
based businesses, and 3 % community revitalization projects or niche markets. NBIA,
Business Incubation Facts,
http://www.nbia.org/resource-center/bus inc facts/index.php (last visited February 6,
2007).
17 See NBIA, supra note 1.
"8 See id.
19 See id.
20 See NBIA, supra note 5. Sponsoring organization breakdown is 2 5 % academic
institutions, 16% government entities, 15% economic development organizations, 10%
for-profit entities, and 10% other types of organizations. About 5% of business
incubators are "hybrids" with more than one sponsor; 19% of incubators have no
sponsor or host organization.
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For the most part, business incubation programs have been highly
successful. Studies indicate that community investment in business
incubators results in a net gain; business incubators stimulate job22 and
wealth creation23 and reduce the risk of business failure. 4 For every $1 of
public investment, incubators generate $30 of local tax revenue.25 The jobs
created by publicly-supported business incubation programs cost an average
of $1,100 each, while other publicly subsidized job-creation programs may
cost the taxpayers as much as $10,000 for each job.26
Clearly, business incubators have tremendous capability to
stimulate small business, and a good attorney is critical to the creation of
27any small business. However, the types of entrepreneurs typically targeted
by business incubators usually are those with the most difficulty in hiring
competent legal assistance. 8 Because the purpose of business incubation is
to provide start-up companies with the services they need but cannot
29
otherwise obtain, it seems natural for business incubators to provide
clients with attorney services.
Working with business incubators and other business development
programs is also a natural fit for the transactional attorney seeking potential
clients or pro bono work.30 Business incubators can be a microcosm of
business law concerns often leading many law school legal clinics to utilize
business incubators in their programs. 31 At least one former business
incubator director has written that the unique set of skills, experiences, and
relationships that attorneys possess make them invaluable in assessing the
21 See id. In the United States, 44% draw clients from urban areas, 3 1 % draw clients
from rural areas, 16 % draw clients from suburban areas, and 9% draw clients from
outside their region or from outside the United States.
22 See id. According to NBIA, every fifty jobs created by a business incubator client
results in an additional twenty-five in the community.
23 See id. Business incubator clients generated approximately $7 billion in revenue in
2001 in North America.
24 See id. According to NBIA, 87 % of its member incubators' clients remain in business
upon exiting the incubation program.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 See Rosen, supra note 8.
28 See Susan R. Jones, Justice, Ethics, and Interdisciplinary Teaching and Practice:
Promoting Social and Economic Justice Through Interdisciplinary Work in
Transactional Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 249, 255-56 (2004).
29 See NBIA, supra note 1.30 See generally Jones, supra note 28 (providing an overview of how working with
small businesses and small business development institutions represents an excellent
opportunity for both altruistic legal practice and transactional legal training).
31 See Eric J. Gouvin, Learning Business Law by Doing 1t, BuS. L. TODAY, Oct. 2004, at
53, 54; see also Charles R. McManis, Answering the Call: The Intellectual Property &
Business Formation Legal Clinic at Washington University, 17 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY
225, 226 & 228 (2005).
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strength of and assisting the furtherance of any economic development
32
opportunity.
However, the distinctive nature of the business incubator-business
incubator client relationship poses significant ethical concerns for the
attorney providing the assistance. While most of the law assumes that
parties to a transaction are self-interested and therefore the attorney
representing a particular party needs to be concerned solely with the welfare
of that party, business incubators do not neatly tit such a dichotomy.
33
Success in business incubation depends on highly interpersonal
relationships between the incubator and client staffs.34 Business incubators
need to be proactive in dealing with the problems clients may face, and as
such, need to be highly involved in the management and operation of the
client firm.35 Furthermore, incubators, operating on tight budgets in order to
keep costs low to clients, also need to find the most efficient resources for
their own operations.
36
Business incubator relationships need to be seen as a group of
distinct entities mutually dependent upon a central organization, the
incubator, for a variety of necessary services. The incubator is highly
interested in the survival and success of its constituent companies in order
to ensure that it may itself be able to survive. Thus, any attorney working in
a business incubator context, whether representing the incubator, incubator
client, or both, needs to be able to keep the entire system in mind when
giving advice. The current model ethics rules, however, force an attorney to
favor one entity over another.
II. CONCURRENT REPRESENTATION AND EQUITY COMPENSATION:
DUTY OF LOYALTY BREACH?
The ethics concerns in question are derivations of basic duty of
32 Al Jones, Lawyers a Boon to Local Economic Development, MONT. LAW. Feb. 1995,
at 7, 8-10. Jones touts the attorney's "overdeveloped skepticism, analytical ability, and
quick access to technical information," client networks, and knowledge of local
economic workings as assets critical to successful economic and business development.
33 See Worldspan L.P. v. The Sabre Group Holdings, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1357
(N.D. Ga. 1998) ("A lawyer [generally] may not represent one client whose interests are
adverse to those of another current client of the lawyer's,.... Courts and ethics panels
generally take a broad view of this restriction .... The rules with respect to concurrent
representation of conflicting interests are rooted in a lawyer's duty of loyalty to the
client."); Cf. McAlpine, supra note 9, at 551-52 ("The law clearly finds it suspicious
when a lawyer enters into a business transaction with his own client... The
presumption is that the savvy lawyer is using his legal knowledge to take advantage of
his unsophisticated client.").
34 See NBIA, supra note 3.
31 See id.
36 See id.
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loyalty problems.37 Attorneys are fiduciaries of their clients. As such, they
owe their clients a duty of loyalty regarding all matters undertaken. As a
part of this duty of loyalty, an attorney is forbidden from assuming any
relationship that could potentially hamper his client's interests. 38 According
to one Court:
It is also an attorney's duty to protect his client in every
possible way, and it is a violation of that duty for him to
assume a position adverse or antagonistic to his client
without the latter's free and intelligent consent given after
full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances .... By
virtue of this rule an attorney is precluded from assuming
any relation which would prevent him from devoting his
entire energies to his client's interests.
39
Furthermore, it is unavailing that the attorney's intent and motivation in
engaging in such a practice is honest.40 The current version of the model
ethics rules specifically addresses both concurrent representation of clients
with potentially diverging interests4 1 and taking an equity stake in a
business when that equity stake may impair the attorney's ability to
represent the client.
42
Despite the discouragement of the rules, such practices are not only
useful to the business incubator and incubator client, but they may be
necessary. Because of the highly interconnected nature of incubator and
incubator clients,43 any attorney working in a business incubation system
must be able to divulge information among the constituents and design
transactions that are mutually beneficial to all involved. Moreover, because
small businesses are traditionally cash-strapped, 44 equity-for-services
arrangements are often attractive for both attorneys and small business
clients.45 Thus, given the highly interconnected nature of the entities
involved in business incubation and the need for alternative forms of
compensation for attorneys, exceptions to the current versions of the ethics
rules should be recognized in order to allow necessary and effective
attorney representation.
37 Paul W. Vapnek, Ethics and Professional Responsibilities issues, in PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE PLI ORDER No. 8990, PATENT PROSECUTION WORKSHOP 2006: CLAIM
DRAFTING & AMENDMENT WRITING 7, 9 (2006).
38 See id.
39 Flatt v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 885 P.2d 950, 958 (Cal. 1994) (quoting
Anderson v. Eaton, 293 P. 788 (Cal. 1930)).
40 See id.
41 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, supra note 6.
42 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8, supra note 7.
43 See NBIA, supra note 3.
44 See Rosen, supra note 8.
45 See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer Independence:
Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 405, 416-21 (2002).
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A. Conflicts of Interest between Business Incubators and Incubator Clients
Two different sets of model ethics rules exist that provide
instructions for conflict of interest situations. Most states have adopted the
newer American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("MRPC"), but a few still base their ethics rules on the older Model Code of
Professional Responsibility ("CPR").46 Despite the evolution of the ethics
rules over the years, the concerns affecting representation in business
incubation have yet to be resolved.
Under MRPC Rule 1.7(a), "a lawyer shall not represent a client if
the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. ' ,47 The rule
goes on to declare that a "concurrent conflict of interest" exists when:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse
to another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one
or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.48
Thus, an attorney is not authorized to represent a client if that representation
is either directly adverse to another client or if there is a significant risk of
material limitation of responsibilities to another client.
Under the older CPR Disciplinary Rule 5-105, a lawyer is not
authorized to accept or continue employment if "the exercise of his
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely
to be adversely affected" by the acceptance or continuation of the
employment, or "if it would be likely to involve him in representing
differing interests. . .,.4' The CPR defines "differing interests" as "every
interest that will adversely affect either the judgment or the loyalty of a
lawyer to a client, whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other
interest.,
50
Under both sets of ethics rules, the attorney providing services in
the incubator context needs to proceed with caution. If the attorney is
providing legal advice to multiple incubator clients as well as the incubator,
situations may arise where the represented parties' interests are, in the
language of the MRPC, directly adverse, or, in the language of the CPR,
differing. Such situations may include negotiations or transactions between
the incubator and the incubator clients, instances where multiple incubator
clients compete in the same industry, and instances of competition between
46 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preface (2003), available at http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/mrpc/preface.html (last visited February 6, 2007).
47 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, supra note 6.
48 Id.
49 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105, supra note 6.
50 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Definition 1 (1983), available at http:/
www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/aba/mcpr/MCPR.HTM (last visited February 6, 2007).
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incubator clients and other clients of the attorney that are not incubator
clients.
The rules authorize an alternative to recusal for the attorney trapped
in a conflict. Under MRPC Rule 1.7(b), an attorney may continue to
represent a client with conflicting interests if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be
able to provide competent and diligent representation to
each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a
claim by one client against another client represented by
the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before
a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed
in writing. 51
CPR Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C) also authorizes the attorney to continue
52representation upon client consent. According to the older rule, "[A]
lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately
represent the interest of each and if each consents to the representation after
full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise
of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each. ', 53
Despite the changed wording, the basic principle under both the
new and old rules is the same; the lawyer needs to fully inform all the
clients of the possible conflicts, and the clients potentially affected by the
conflict must adequately demonstrate consent. However, there are some
material differences that the practicing attorney should note. The MRPC
requires the lawyer himself to reasonably believe that he is able to provide
competent representation 54 while the CPR seems to require an objective
55 56determination.55 The MRPC requires that consent be evidenced in writing,
while the CPR does not require a writing.5 The MRPC requires compliance
with other portions of the law regarding representation in order to comply
with the ethics guidelines.58 The CPR does not necessarily ignore this
point, but it does not make compliance a part of the conflicts-consent test.
59
Thus, the rules do not necessarily prevent an attorney from
simultaneously representing a business incubator and the incubator's
51 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, supra note 6.
52 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105, supra note 6.
53 id.
54 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, supra note 6.
51 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105, supra note 6.
56 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, supra note 6.
57 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105, supra note 6.
58 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, supra note 6.
59 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105, supra note 6.
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clients.60 While such relationships are conflicts of interests, nothing
prevents all the concerned parties from giving consent to the
representation.6' It is possible that the relationship between the incubator
and incubator client could permit the parties to establish from the outset the
types of conflicts that may arise and set up the proper procedural safeguards
that satisfy the requirements for the particular jurisdiction.
The nature of the business incubation relationship is such that it
should be presumed that consent is granted, and neither the newer MRPC
nor the older CPR allows this. Incubator clients come to the business
incubator because they want the incubator to be involved in their
operations. 62 Incubators accept the clients because they want to be involved
63in the operations. The relationships are not hostile; they are mutually
cooperative and highly involved.64 By presuming, instead, that the incubator
and incubator client are pursuing differing interests, the ethics rules place an
additional burden on attorneys working in the incubator context which may
discourage many attorneys from providing needed assistance to business
incubators and incubator clients.65
Furthermore, the mechanics for effective consent are unnecessary
in business incubation. Comment 20 to MRPC Rule 1.7 explains:
Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed
consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a writing
may consist of a document executed by the client or one
that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the client
following an oral consent .... If it is not feasible to obtain
or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed
consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a
reasonable time thereafter. . . . The requirement of a
writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the
lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and
advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a
conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available
alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable
opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to
raise questions and concerns.66
As discussed above, entities involved in business incubation do not need the
risks and advantages of concurrent representation explained to them. The
'0 See S.C. Bar. Eth. Adv. Comm., Adv. Op. 98-05 (1998).
61 See id.
62 See NBIA, supra note 1.
63 See id.
64 See NBIA, supra note 3.
65 See McAlpine, supra note 9, at 567.
66 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 20 (2003), available at http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule 1 7 comm.html (last visited February 6, 2007) (emphasis
added).
516 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 2:1
JOURNAL
interconnectivity is the hallmark of business incubation; it is the reason the
client companies seek out business incubators, and it is the reason business
incubators operate the way they do. The risks are accepted, and the
advantages are welcomed by implication. Consent to representation should
also be implied.
Additionally, acquiring consent at the outset of representation in the
business incubation context for future services is often ineffective.
According to one source, the key issues in such advance waiver instances
are "(1) whether the future 'unrelated' matter is adequately identified, (2)
whether the party giving the waiver is adequately sophisticated, (3) whether
the waiver is recent enough, and (4), in some cases, whether the waiving





These issues are burdensome for attorneys and may make it
difficult for effective representation to occur within the business incubation
context. In Iowa S. Ct. Att'y. Disc. Bd. v. Clauss, the Supreme Court of
Iowa, in applying its version of CPR DR 5-105, ruled that an attorney must
do more than simply disclose that the potential for conflict exists and then
request a waiver of those potential conflicts. 68 An attorney is required to
make a "full disclosure" under the rule, 6 9 and, according to the Court, this
means the attorney must "explain in detail the pitfalls that may arise in the
course of the transaction which would make it desirable that the
[prospective client] obtain independent counsel."' 0
Other courts have also placed a heavy burden on an attorney
seeking waiver based on the concern for full disclosure of conflicts. In
Worldspan L.P. v. The Sabre Group Holdings, Inc., a federal district court,
interpreting Georgia's version of CPR DR 5-105, declared that lapse of
time could likely render any waiver ineffective. 7 1 Furthermore, the court
held that conflicts disclosure must specifically identify the particular
conflict at issue, including references to parties, to be effective. 2 In Hasco,
Inc. v. Roche, the court held that a waiver was restricted to only those
actions expressly detailed in the disclosure and could not extend to other
actions between the same parties, even though the purpose of the waiver
67 William Freivogel, WaiversConsents, FREIVOGEL ON CONFLICTS, http:/www.
freivogelonconflicts.com/newpage 38.htm#Advance%20Waivers (last visited
February 6, 2007).
68 lowa S. Ct. Att'y. Disc. Bd v. Clauss, 711 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2006).
69 id.
70 Id.
71 Worldspan L.P. v. The Sabre Group Holdings, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1358 (N.D.
Ga. 1998).
72 Id. at 1360. Note, however, that the court states that the need for explicitness in
disclosures is because "[tihe client-lawyer relationship ... is based on mutual trust..
Id. at 1358. Considering that the incubator-incubator client relationship is also based on
mutual trust, it would seem odd to restrict an attorney from practicing in a context
where both mutually trusting parties request his or her services.
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"was to waive all future conflicts of any nature. 7 3 In Concat LP v.
Unilever, PLC, a federal district court in California required an attorney to
execute a more specific disclosure of conflicts subsequent to a general
disclosure of potential conflicts if the original disclosure did not specifically
address the conflict.
74
These cases demonstrate that full disclosure means explicit
disclosure, which must include the exact parties in conflict and the exact
claims over which waiver is sought. This rule impairs the lawyer's ability to
function in the business incubation system because business incubators
often provide a wide array of services to a variety of business types.
Adequately identifying all the potential types of work an attorney may
perform for each and every incubator client, now existing and yet to exist, is
virtually impossible.
Furthermore, incubator clients are typically unsophisticated; hence,
they turn to the incubator (and the attorney) for guidance regarding business
76(and legal) issues. Additionally, because incubator clients, like most small
businesses, tend to be cash-strapped,77 seeking independent counsel
regarding the potential conflict is probably not an option. Even if it were, at
least one case suggests that it would still be of no avail under the rule. 8
B. Attorney Services as Part of an Incubator's Bundle of Services
Related to the concurrent representation issues raised above is the
issue of whether an attorney can make his or her services available to
incubator clients as a part of an incubator's bundle of services. Successful
business incubation programs require interconnectivity and efficiency.79
Incubators, thus, will typically offer client companies a bundle of services
in exchange for a fee. 80 Because attorneys are critical to small business
formation, 81 providing legal services as a part of the bundle of incubator
services makes logical sense. However, the ethics rules place restraints on
an attorney when the attorney represents an organization rather than the
organization's constituents, and it is unclear whether the rule would apply
73 Hasco, Inc. v. Roche, 700 N.E.2d 768, 776 (111. App. 1998).
74 ConcatLP v. Unilever, PLC, 350 F. Supp. 2d 796, 821 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
75 See NBIA, supra note 1.
76 See id.
77 C(f NBIA, supra note 5 (one of the primary goals of business incubators is to connect
their start-up clients with funding sources).
78 Glidden Co. v. Jandernoa, 173 F.R.D. 459, 480 (W.D. Mich. 1997) ("Where dual
representation creates a conflict of interest, the burden is on the attorney involved to
approach both clients with an affirmative disclosure and a request for express consent.
Independent consultation with another lawyer by the opposing party is insufficient to
satisfy the obligation of full disclosure.").
79 See NBIA, supra note 3.
80 See NBIA, supra note 1.8' See Rosen, supra note 8.
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to an organization such as a business incubator and its constituent client
companies. 
2
Additionally, attorneys may be able to provide non-legal services to
small businesses, such as accounting, business planning, or financial
advising, thereby improving the interpersonal relationships between the
attorney and incubator client and decreasing the incubator's need to find
other competent experts. But again, the model rules limit an attorney's
ability to adequately represent entities in the business incubation context.
8 3
As such, the model ethics rules do not accommodate the practical needs of
entities involved in business incubation.
1. Co-Representation of an Incubator and Incubator Clients
Do ethics rules permit an attorney to represent both a business
incubator and an incubator client at the same time as a part of the
incubator's bundle of services? For the MRPC, Rule 1.13 guides when an
attorney is representing an organizational client. Under Rule 1.13(a), a
lawyer employed or retained by an organization owes full allegiance to the
organization8 4 Thus, it would seem like the attorney's representation
would be limited to either the incubator or the incubator client. However,
this rule was probably crafted with traditional corporations in mind in order
to deal with intracorporate conflicts such as derivative actions where the
attorney may be providing legal advice to individual board members, since
corporations may only act through such constituents8 5 Presumably, the
conflicts potentially arising in the business incubator context do not include
the same issues normally faced in intracorporate conflicts, so MRPC Rule
1 .13(a) is probably not a concern.
Furthermore, even if MRPC Rule 1.13(a) did apply, Rule 1.13(g)
provides an avenue for relief. Under that provision, an attorney representing
an organization may also represent officers, directors, employees,
shareholders, members, or other constituents, subject to the conflict of
86interest provisions of Rule 1.7. Thus, as long as the constituents consent to
the representation and otherwise comply with Rule 1.7, no issue should be
raised under Rule 1.13. However, this also means that the concurrent
82 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule 1 13.html (last visited February 6, 2007).
83 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule 5 7.html (last visited February 6, 2007).
84 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13, supra note 82.85 Darian M. Ibrahim, Solving the Everyday Problem of Client Identity in the Context of
Closely Held Businesses, 56 ALA. L. REV. 181, 192 (2004); See also MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 1 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/
rule 1 13 comm.html (last visited February 6, 2007).
86 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13, supra note 82.
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representation concerns raised above with regard to Rule 1.7 also may be
present under Rule 1.13.
CPR Ethical Consideration 5-18 parallels MRPC 1.13 in
proclaiming that an attorney only represent the organization, and may
represent others only if the attorney believes that no conflict exists. 8 7 The
language of the older EC 5-18 is also more encompassing in that it includes
any "other person connected with the entity," 88 with "person" including
"any other legal entity."8 9 As such, it is not clear that the rule would apply
only to corporations, directors, officers, and other insiders. Because of the
high level of interconnectivity between business incubators and incubator
client companies, such language could be construed to create a potential
violation of the provision.
Both the MRPC and the CPR provisions provide a way out for the
attorney in a business incubation context: consent. However, as discussed
above, the avenue for relief may place the unwelcome burden of ensuring
that all parties consent to the concurrent representation and that the waivers
satisfy the statutory requirements. In a business incubator, it is understood
that the parties must be highly interconnected. The relationship is not an
adversarial one; it is a cooperative one. By presuming that the attorney only
works to the advantage of one party and to the disadvantage of all other
parties, the ethics rules ignore the reality of the relationship. It would make
more sense to give attorneys working in such interconnected relationships
the benefit of the doubt.
2. Non-Legal Services Offered by Attorneys
In addition to providing legal services, an attorney may provide
non-legal services to clients. In fact, because of their special training and
community contacts, and because of the financial limitations of small
businesses, attorneys often are the best option for providing non-legal
services. 90 Attorneys, therefore, represent an even greater resource for
business incubators needing to maintain the most efficient operations
possible.
Neither the MRPC nor the CPR prevents an attorney from
providing non-legal services. However, under MRPC Rule 5.7, an attorney
is subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct when providing "law-related
87 MODEL CODE OF PROF' L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1983), available at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/aba/mcpr/MCPR.HTM (last visited February 6,
2007).
88 Id.
89 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Definition 2 (1983), available at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/aba/mcpr/MCPR.HTM (last visited February 6,
2007).
90 See Jones, supra note 32, at 8-9.
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services." 91 "Law-related services" are services that might reasonably be
performed along with and are substantially related to legal services
provided, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when
provided by a non-lawyer. 92 However, the law-related services are only
subject to the rule if they are provided:
(1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from
the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients; or
(2) in other circumstances by an entity controlled by the
lawyer individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take
reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the
law-related services knows that the services are not legal
services and that the protections of the client-lawyer
relationship do not exist.
93
Essentially, the rule states that the lawyer is bound to the Rules of
Professional Conduct when his non-legal services are not distinct from his
legal services or when the lawyer fails to reasonably ensure that the
recipient of the non-legal services is aware that the services are distinct and
are offered by an entity the lawyer controls.
94
While there is no ethics rule against providing non-legal services,
attorneys still need to be careful when doing so. MRPC Rule 5.7 has been
criticized as failing to recognize that the primary concern should be whether
or not the client may reasonably believe that the privileges of attorney-
client privilege extend to the services performed.95 Instead, the rule imposes
the privilege only when an entity controlled by the lawyer provides the
services and the lawyer fails to ensure that the client recognizes that the
privilege does not apply. 96 According to one court, the attorney-client
privilege should apply if(I) the asserted holder of the privilege is, or sought
to become, a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made is
acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication was made for the purpose of
securing primarily either an opinion of law, legal services, or assistance in
some legal proceeding; and (4) the privilege has been claimed and not
waived by the client.97 The court, thus, removes the controlled-entity
requirement from the test.98
Furthermore, MRPC Rule 1.6(a) states that an attorney is not
authorized to reveal information regarding the client unless (1) the client
gives informed consent, (2) the authorization is implied in order to carry out
91 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7, supra note 83.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Andrew M. Goldner, Note, Minding Someone Else's Businesses: Pennsylvania Rule
of Professional Conduct 5.7 Leads the Way, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 767, 774 (1998).
9' See id. at 779.
96 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7, supra note 83.
97 Deustch v. Cogan, 580 A.2d 100, 103-04 (Del. Ch. 1990).
98 ,,
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the representation, or (3) is otherwise authorized by the rules. 99 Thus, under
Rule 5.7, an attorney will be subject to Rule 1.6 if providing law-related
services, rather than merely providing pure legal services, and Rule 1.6
requires the attorney not to reveal representational information. However,
because business incubators and business incubator clients are by their very
nature interconnected,10 0 it is necessary for the lawyer to reveal
representational information about each entity to the other.
The rules get even trickier when dealing with unintentional clients.
An attorney's client may become a client either expressly or impliedly.' 0'
Thus, an attorney may wind up in an attorney-client relationship with a
client-and be required to maintain confidentiality-unintentionally. To
create an implied attorney-client relationship, the purported client must
show (1) that it submitted confidential information to the attorney, and (2)
that it did so under a reasonable belief that the attorney was serving as its
lawyer. 102 Because attorneys in the business incubation context may be
offering non-legal as well as legal services, there may be confusion among
clients as to whether there is legal representation. If the client is under a
reasonable belief that an attorney-client relationship exists, Rule 1.6 may
prevent the sharing of information among incubators and incubator clients,
a necessity in the business incubator context.
C. Equity Compensation
More and more, attorneys and law firms are exchanging their
services for equity positions in their business clients instead of cash.
0 3
Doing so provides an easy capital source for the small business (which
more than likely is highly cash-strapped) and reduces transaction costs by
making it easier for the small business to identify potential sources of
capital.10 4 Small businesses in business incubators are no different. Thus,
compensating the attorney with equity for services rendered in lieu of cash
would be advantageous to incubator clients.
However, the current ethics rules frown upon such practices. 105
According to MRPC Rule 1.8, an attorney may not obtain an ownership
interest in a client that is adverse to a client unless (1) the transaction and
terms are fair and reasonable to the client, fully disclosed, and reduced to a
writing that can be reasonably understood by the client; (2) a writing
advises the client of the desirability of seeking independent counsel, and
99 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/ rule 1 6.html (last visited February 6, 2007).
100 See NBIA, supra note 3.
101 Montgomery Academy v. Kohn, 50 F. Supp. 2d 344, 350 (D. N.J. 1999).
102 Id.
103 See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 45, at 407-15.
104 McAlpine, supra note 9, at 569.
105 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8, supra note 7.
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reasonable opportunity is provided to seek independent counsel on the
transaction; and (3) the client provides informed, written, and signed
consent to the essential terms of and the lawyer's role in the transaction. 106
Several potential issues arise. First, there is the relatively
unsophisticated nature of entrepreneurs with businesses that are clients of
some incubators. 107 These entrepreneurs may not be able to realistically
understand the technicalities and legal issues surrounding an equity
transaction. Second, it may be impossible for the small business to obtain
independent counsel for the transaction; the small business is seeking the
equity-for-services transaction because it is cash strapped and unable to pay
cash for attorney representation. Finally, the language of the rule indicates
that the equity transaction is forbidden if it would be adverse to any
client. 08 Thus, the attorney is required to keep in mind the demands of all
the incubator clients the attorney represents as well as the incubator itself
when deciding to take an equity stake in any one incubator client.
The older CPR DR 5-104 forbids all business transactions with
clients where the parties may have differing interests, unless the client
consents. Therefore, the consent issues discussed above are raised under
both the newer and older versions of the model rules.
III. A BETTER PARADIGM: ACCOMMODATING THE NEEDS OF THE
INCUBATOR SYSTEM
As discussed above, various aspects of the model ethics rules place
significant restraints on the ability of a lawyer to effectively function as
needed in the business incubator system. While the ethics rules presume
that parties to a transaction are purely self-interested and, therefore, require
an attorney to pick the side for which he will advocate,10 9 entities engaging
in business incubation transactions are cooperative and mutually
dependent." 0 Furthermore, often the only potential way to facilitate
attorney involvement in small business development is to allow a degree of
attorney self-dealing,11 to which the ethics rules also take a heavy handed
approach under the presumption that the lawyer is taking advantage of his
client.11 2 Compounding the situation is the confusing and often conflicting
106 id.
107 See NBIA, supra note 1.
108 Id.
109 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, supra note 6; see also MODEL CODE
OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105, supra note 6; see also Concat LP v. Unilever,
PLC, supra note 74, at 819 ("When evaluating whether a law firm may concurrently
represent two clients, even on unrelated matters, it is presumed that the duty of loyalty
has been breached and counsel is automatically disqualified.").
110 See NBIA, supra note 3.
111 See McAlpine, supra note 9, at 557-58.
112 Id., at 552.
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guidance from the courts as to when a lawyer's co-representation and self-
dealing is a violation of ethics duties." 3 Thus, a new, clear paradigm of the
relationships between lawyers and multiple parties in certain transactional
relationships is needed to ensure that business incubators and business
incubator clients can receive effective legal counsel.
A. A Realistic Approach to Conflicts of Interest
As discussed above, business incubation requires involvement of
business incubators in the operations of incubator clients as well as the
dependence of incubator clients on the incubators for survival.' 14 An
attorney working in such an environment must be able to strike a balance
between the competing needs of the parties. This is similar to the situation
faced by the attorney working in the context of a close corporation wherein
several individuals come to a single attorney for assistance with setting up a
corporation in which each will have an interest. As such, a possible new
paradigm for business incubators is one taken by some commentators and
courts in regard to closely-held corporations." 5 Under this so-called
"aggregate theory," the lawyer represents not only the firm but also all of
the constituents in aggregate. 16 The basic idea is that, as a practical matter,
the close corporation is usually better off if the lawyer represents all the
interested parties, so representation of all the parties should be the rule
rather than the exception." 7
However, the aggregate theory's effectiveness is limited because it
still requires the lawyer to recuse him or herself from representing any party
once a conflict does arise.11 8 Thus, while the aggregate theory may better
represent the notion that business incubator service offerings necessitate
113 See generally Ze'-ev Eiger & Brandy Rutan, Comment, Conflicts of Interest:
Attorneys Representing Parties iith Adverse Interests in the Same Commercial
Transaction, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 945, 960-61 (2001). Eiger and Rutan highlight
cases in various states and the application of the ethics rules to various business
transactions, and conclude that the case law does not "establish discernable legal trends
or illuminate prior case law to guide attorneys seeking to represent parties with adverse
interests in commercial transactions." However, Eiger and Rutan also conclude that
courts generally presume that clients in certain transactional relationships (such as
lender-borrower, seller-purchaser, majority-minority shareholder, corporation-corporate
officer, and general-limited partner) are naturally adverse.
114 See NBIA, supra note 3.
115 Ibrahim, supra note 85, at 192; In re Banks, 584 P.2d 284, 290 (Or. 1978); In re
Brownstein, 602 P.2d 655, 657 (Or. 1979).
116 Ibrahim, supra note 85, at 193. For a discussion of when it is appropriate to invoke
such a rule, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Professional Responsibility and the Close
Corporation: Toward a Realistic Ethic, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 466, 506-08 (1989).
117 See Mitchell, supra note 116.
118 Banks, supra note 115, at 292 ("[T]he only ethical position for an attorney to adopt
when substantially identical interests which he has represented become divergent is to
represent neither the individual nor the corporation.").
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interconnectivity, it still does not provide a solution to whether an attorney
may represent both the incubator and the incubator client when conflicts
arise. If anything, the attorney would be disallowed from representing either
party when a material conflict arose, 9 leaving incubators and clients no
choice but to seek additional counsel (and accumulate additional expenses)
in order to obtain any legal representation.
A different concept of the attorney-client relationship may make
more sense in the business incubator context. This construct has been
termed the "Framework of Dealing" or "counsel for the situation"
approach.12 0 According to the Framework of Dealing approach, in the
context of a close corporation:
The corporation derives its unity from a legal structure
designed to reconcile the interests of its constituents ...
Understood in terms of its full legal structure, the
corporation's identity includes, in addition to a set of
decision-making procedures, a substantive commitment
that its constituents be treated fairly. Thus, a corporation
has an interest in the fair treatment of its constituents.
121
A business incubator can be thought of similarly. The necessary
interconnectivity among the incubator and incubator clients requires that the
incubator make a substantial commitment that the client firms be treated
fairly. 1
2 2
Under the Framework of Dealing approach, the attorney does not
choose one party to advise in a conflict, nor must the attorney recuse
himself when particular interests within the aggregate differ.123 Instead, the
attorney serves as counsel for the situation. 24 The attorney looks at the
issue substantively as a referee and issues an opinion as to the legal rights
of all parties involved.1 25 If the attorney cannot determine the substantive
merits of the dispute, then the attorney is to remain neutral. z6 However,
such a construct may be valid only if each party is represented by an
additional, independent counsel.127 As in the aggregate theory approach, a
119 See Ibrahim, supra note 85, at 199.
120 William H. Simon, Whom (Or What) Does the Organization's Lawyer Represent?:
An Anatomy ofIntraclient Conflict, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 57, 88 (2003). Simon attributes
the phrase "counsel for the situation" to Louis Brandeis, who used the strategy in one
particular instance. Brandeis stated that his goal was "to give everybody, to the best of
[his] ability, a square deal" and "to see that everybody got his legal rights." (citing
Alpheus Thomas Mason, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 233-34 (1956)).
121 See Simon, supra note 120, at 86.
122 See NBIA, supra note 3.
123 See Simon, supra note 120, at 86-87.
124 Id. at 88.
125 Id. at 86-88.
126 Id. at 87-88.
127 Posting of Charles E. Lundberg, CHUCKL@bassford.com, to Association of
Professional Responsibility Lawyers Listserv (Dec. 2, 2006) (on file with author).
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small business's ability to obtain counsel is made even more difficult once a
conflict arises by the need for additional expenses.
The better approach would simply be to create an exception within
the current rules that where the very nature of the relationships of the
parties is highly interconnected and cooperative, and although the potential
for future differences may exist, as long as the parties are not hostile,
consent to representation should be presumed. Business incubators need a
framework of organizational representation that recognizes their holistic
nature. The incubator provides many services to clients, including operating
space, but also business advice, certain management services, and financial
access.1 28 The ethics approach to client representation issues needs to
recognize that incubator clients are dependent on the incubator for many of
the essential business functions that a traditional corporation would perform
for itself. The current rules do not allow for such, and, therefore, the
exception needs to be allowed.
B. More Flexibility Neededfor Consent Waivers
The current rules are also too rigid with regard to consent waivers.
Under MRPC Rule 1.7, it is the attorney's responsibility to acquire
"informed consent, confirmed in writing." 129 The Comments to the Rule
state that, with regard to consent to future conflict, such consent is usually
ineffective where it is general and open-ended. 130 However, considering the
variety of incubator-types,' 3 ' incubator-client types, 32 service offerings,
and economic circumstances that differ from incubator system to incubator
system,134 it would be near impossible for an attorney to identify and
explain every type of instance in which a conflict may arise to an incubator
or incubator client. Additionally, considering the necessity of incubator
flexibility1 35 and interconnectivity in the relationship, 136 limiting the types
of representation an attorney can provide based on the attorney's ability to
identify those matters at the outset of the relationship would prevent the
attorney from providing all the services that the clients need.
Incubators and incubator clients need attorneys to be flexible;1 37 the
rules should be equally flexible in order to accommodate effective
128 See NBIA, supra note 1.
129 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, supra note 6.
130 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 22 (2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule 1 7 comm.html (last visited February 6, 2007).
See NBIA, supra note 1.
132 See id
' See id
134 See id; see also NBIA, supra note 5.
135 See NBIA, supra note 1.
136 See NBIA, supra note 3.
137 See NBIA, supra note 1.
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representation. Because the relationship between business incubators and
business incubator clients is so interconnected, 38 the ethics rules guiding
attorneys should acknowledge that consent to concurrent representation is
implied by the very existence of the incubator-incubator client relationship.
C. Attorney Confidence and the Necessity of Revealing Information
Because of their unique arrangements, attorneys for incubator
clients are in perhaps the best position to offer certain non-legal services
along with their legal services. 139 Furthermore, because the relationship
between the business incubator and its clients is highly dependent on
communication between the constituent entities, 140 attorneys for incubator
clients must be able to provide privileged information regarding the status
of the incubator clients to the business incubator. While Rule 1.6 may be a
hurdle to effective communication and representation by an attorney in the
business incubation context, it allows disclosure when it is "impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation. 1 4 1
In the business incubation context, the consent to communicate
should be implied by the close nature and interconnectedness of the
constituent entities. Thus, the rules probably do not significantly limit an
attorney working in business incubation from sharing information with the
incubator and the incubator client.
D. Equity Compensation and the Need to Consider Context
As discussed above, often a small business may only be able to
obtain effective legal representation through creative attorney-compensation
schemes, such as equity compensation.1 2 However, MRPC Rule 1.8 places
strict requirements on transactions between attorneys and clients, including
equity-for-legal services transactions. 4 3 Instead, the ethics guidelines
presume that an attorney entering into a business transaction with a client is
taking advantage of the client.14 4 This approach ignores the reality of many
equity compensation transactions and closes off an option that business
incubators and incubator clients could use to attract quality legal
representation.
In order to successfully navigate the requirements for attorney
equity compensation transactions, one commentator, Antonella Popoff,
makes several recommendations, including (1) limiting the size of the
38 See NBIA, supra note 3.
139 See Jones, supra note 32.
140 See NBIA, supra note 1; see also NBIA, supra note 3.
141 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, supra note 99.
142 See McAlpine, supra note 9, at 557-58.
143 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8, supra note 7.
144 See McAlpine, supra note 9, at 552.
20071 ATTORNEY ETHICS RULES AND SMALL BUSINESS 527
DEVELOPMENT
investment so that there is little if any concern regarding control,
domination, or conflict; (2) taking the bulk of fees in cash; (3) using
independent third parties to value the investment; (4) providing detailed
disclosures of conflicts; (5) disclosing stock ownership when appropriate;
and (6) remaining impartial in board and management disputes. 145 However,
these recommendations do not help business incubator clients much. The
point of offering equity in lieu of cash is to save as much cash as possible,
and the point of offering the equity to the lawyer is to reduce costs by
having to find independent investors.1 6 Popoffs recommendations ignore
these needs.
Instead, the better course is for courts and rule-makers to
acknowledge that the rules were not drafted to cover situations like those
present in incubators where the parties are mutually cooperative, dependent,
and highly interconnected. One commentator argues that for equity
investments in high-growth company clients attorneys should not be
required to comply with the ethics rule. 147 Instead, basic fiduciary duties
provide more flexibility to the attorney, who needs to be adaptive to the
needs of individual clients. 14 Community norms developed around start-up
and equity financiers provide a better gauge for ethics violations than
bright-line rules designed to prevent an attorney from compromising one
client for the sake of another hostile client.
1 49
Such an approach also makes sense in the business incubation
context. An attorney's incentive derives as much from the desire to
maintain business relationships with the business incubator and incubator
clients as much as it does from the threat of ethics violations. 150 Helping the
small businesses out by taking equity in lieu of cash also strengthens the
interconnectedness of the constituent entities; the attorney's own welfare is
dependent on his or her ability to provide competent services and assist the
incubator clients toward growth. 5'
145 Antonella T. Popoff, Lawyers Taking Equity Interests in Internet Companies Must be
Alert to Special Ethical Risks, 74 N.Y. ST. B.J. 19, 21 (2002).
146 See McAlpine, supra note 9, at 572-75.
147 See id. generally.
148 See id. at 567-68.
149 See id. at 587.
150 Cf McApline, supra note 9, at 569-82. McAlpine reviews various advantages for
both clients and lawyers engaging in equity acquisitions. When a lawyer has a personal
financial stake in a client company, that lawyer will be more inclined to ensure that the
client has the proper procedures and relationships to best situate itself for long term
success. Id. at 574-75.
151 See McApline, supra note 9, at 574-75. Considering that in business incubation, the
business incubator's goal is also to ensure that its small business clients have the proper
procedures and relationships in place to best situate themselves for long term success as
well as financing sources (NBIA, supra note 1), it may be of even greater advantage to
utilize attorney equity compensation schemes in the business incubation context than in
normal small business attorney representation.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In the context of a business incubator, an attorney must make sure
to avoid tripping over any ethics violation. The highly interconnected nature
of a business incubator and its client companies152 can easily result in
conflicts of interest among all the parties involved in the operation.
Concurrent representation of the business incubator and business incubator
clients may require a special relational construct that the current versions of
the model ethics rules do not recognize or appreciate.
Rather than requiring attorneys to obtain consent from all parties in
concurrent representation and equity compensation instances, the rules
should acknowledge their own limitations and provide exceptions where the
potentially conflicted parties are highly interconnected. In such instances,
the attorney must be able to disclose information among clients, structure
transactions with all clients in mind, and provide services in the manner that
are most helpful for all clients. The current rules do not allow attorneys to
do this,and, therefore, need revision.
Additionally, when attorneys do attempt to obtain waivers from
clients for potential conflicts, the rules do not allow the necessary flexibility
in identifying future conflicts required in the business incubation context.
Business incubators come in a variety of types, serving a variety of clients,
offering a variety of services, and operating in a variety of economic
contexts; 53 it would be extremely difficult for an attorney to accurately
identify all potential conflicts at the outset of representation. Any waiver of
conflicts would almost necessarily have to be open and general, which are
the exact kind of waiver that the commentaries to Rule 1.7 frown upon. 54
Thus, the very nature of the business incubation construct conflicts with the
ethics rules' conceptualization of waiver. The easiest way for courts to
address this would be to recognize that the rules were not drafted with
business incubators in mind and to craft an exception to the rule.
Finally, the ethics rules impose restrictions that are too harsh on
transactions between lawyers and clients to accommodate effective
representation in the business incubation setting. The rules presume that an
attorney entering into a business deal with a client is taking advantage of
the client.155 This presumption ignores the economic reality that an attorney
whose compensation is dependent on the success of a business client will
have an even greater incentive to promote the client's success through his
representation .156
The rules simply were not drafted with mutually dependent,
cooperative entities in mind. As such, attorneys working in an environment
152 See NBIA, supra note 3.
153 See NBIA, supra note 1.
154 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 22, supra note 130.
155 See McAlpine, supra note 9, at 552.
56 See id., at 574-75.
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such as a business incubator should not be required to adhere to the ethics
rules restricting the use of equity compensation. Instead, more flexible
standards of fraud and community norms would provide entities and
attorneys with the ability to tailor compensation packages to meet their
personal needs while at the same time providing adequate protection against
abuse.

